stars at fuch a distance from our folar system, as that their light should not have had time to reach us, even from the creation of the world to this day. Ver. 234. - the neglect Of all familiar prospects, &c.] It is here faid, that in consequence of the love of novelty, objects which at first were highly delightful to the mind, lose that effect by repeated attention to them. But the instance of habit is opposed to this observation; for there, objects at first distasteful are in time rendered intirely agreeable by repeated attention. The difficulty in this cafe will be removed, if we consider, that, when objects at first agreeable, lofe that influence by frequently recurring, the mind is wholly paffive and the perception involuntary; but habit, on the other hand, generally supposes choice and activity accompanying it: fo that the pleasure arises here not from the object, but from the mind's confcious determination of its own activity; and consequently increases in proportion to the frequency of that determination. It will still be urged perhaps, that a familiarity with disagreeable objects renders them at length acceptable, even when there is no room for the mind to resolve or act at all. In this cafe, the appearance must be accounted for, one of these ways. The pleasure from habit may be merely negative. The object at first gave uneasiness: this uneafiness gradually wears off as the object grows familiar: and the mind, finding it at last entirely removed, reckons kons its fituation really pleasurable, compared with what it had experienced before. The diflike conceived of the object at first, might be owning to prejudice or want of attention. Confequently the mind, being neceffitated to review it often, may at length perceive its own mistake, and be reconciled to what it had looked on with aversion. In which cafe, a fort of instinctive justice naturally leads it to make amends for the injury, by running toward the other extreme of fondness and attachment. Or lastly, though the object itself should always continue disagreeable, yet circumstances of pleasure or good fortune may occur along with it. Thus ar association may arife in the mind, and the object never be remembered without those pleasing circumstances attending it; by which means the disagreeable impreffion which it at first occafioned will in time be quite obliterated. Ver. 240. -this defire Of objects new and strange ) Thefe two ideas are often confounded; though it is evident the mere novelty of an object makes it agreeable, even where the mind is not affected with the least degree of wonder: whereas wonder indeed always implies novelty, being never excited by common or well-known appearances. But the pleasure in both cafes is explieable from the fame final cause, the acquifition of knowledge and inlargement of our views of nature: on this account, it is natural to treat of them together. : -Ver. 374. Truth and good are one, "Do And beauty dwells in them, &c.] you imagine," says Socrates to Aristippus, " that "what is good is not beautiful? Have you not oba " served that these appearances always coincide "Virtue, for instance, in the same respect as to which " we call it good, is ever acknowledged to be beau"tiful also. In the characters of men we always * " join the two denominations together. The beauty of " human bodies corresponds, in like manner, with "that economy of parts which conftitutes them good; " and in every circumstance of life, the same object " is constantly accounted both beautiful and good, " inasmuch as it answers the purposes for which it " was designed." Xenophont. Memorab. Socrat. 1. iii. c. 8. This excellent observation has been illustrated and extended by the noble restorer of ancient philosophy; fee the Characteristicks, vol. ii. p. 339 and 422, and vol. iii. p. 181. And another ingenious author has particularly shewn, that it holds in the general laws of nature, in the works of art, and the conduct of the sciences. Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, Treat. i. § 8. As to the connection between beauty and truth, there are two opinions concerning it. Some philosophers assert an independent and invariable law in nature, in consequence of which "all rational beings must alike perceive beauty in * This the Athenians did in a particular manner, by the word καλοκαΓαθὸς, καλοκαγαθία. " fome " some certain proportions, and deformity in the con"trary." And this neceffity being supposed the fame with that which commands the assent or diffent of the understanding, it follows of course that beauty is founded on the universal and unchangeable law of truth. But others there are, who believe beauty to be merely a relative and arbitrary thing; that indeed it was a benevolent provision in nature to annex so delightful a sensation to those objects which are best and most perfect in themselves, that so we might be engaged to the choice of them at once and without staying to infer their usefulness from their structure and effects; but that it is not impossible, in a physical sense, that two beings, of equal capacities for truth, should perceive, one of them beauty and the other deformity, in the same proportions. And upon this supposition, by that truth which is always connected with beauty, nothing more can be meant than the conformity of any object to those proportions upon which, after careful examination, the beauty of that speices is found to depend. Polycletus, for instance, a famous ancient sculptor, from an accurate mensuration of the several parts of the most perfect human bodies, deduced a canon or system of proportions, which was the rule of all fucceeding artists. Suppose a statue modelled according to this: a man of mere natural taste, upon looking at it, without entering into its proportions, confefses and admires its beauty; whereas a professor of the art applies his measures to the head, the neck, or the hand, - and, without attending to its beauty, pronounces the workmanship to be just and true. Ver. 492. As when Brutus rose, &c.] Cicero him felf describes this fact-" Cæfare interfecto-statim " cruentum altè extollens M. Brutus pugionem, Ci "ceronem nominatim exclamavit, atque ei recupera" tam libertatem est gratulatus." Cic. Philipp. ii. 12. Ver. 548. Where Virtue rising from the awful depth Of truth's mysterious bosom, &c.] According to the opinion of those who assert moral obligation to be founded on an immutable and universal law; and that which is usually called the moral fenfe, to be determined by the peculiar temper of the imagination and the earliest associations of ideas. Ver. 591. Lycéum.] The school of Ariftotle. Ver. 594. Ilyffus.] One of the rivers on which Athens was situated. Plato, in some of his finest dialogues, lays the scene of the conversation with Socrates on its banks. کام NOTES ON BOOK II. Ver. 19. At last the Muses rofe, &c.] About the age of Hugh Capet, founder of the third race of French kings, the poets of Provence were in high reputation; a fort of strolling bards or rhapsodists, who went about the courts of princes and noblemen, entertaining them at festivals with music and poetry. They VOL. LXIII. attempted U |