The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability After the Cold WarArguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry. |
Contents
Cumulation in International Relations Methodological Constraints and Solutions | 3 |
Nuclear Deterrence The Record of Aggregate Testing | 19 |
New Directions for Aggregate Testing | 47 |
Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry 194888 | 56 |
USSoviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence | 94 |
Nuclear Stability after the Cold War | 112 |
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Common terms and phrases
actors alternative analysis approach assess assumptions attack behaviour Berlin blockade 1948 Bosnian Serbs Brams and Kilgour Brecher Bueno de Mesquita chapter coding coercive Cold War cooperation credibility crises crisis management Cuban missile crisis data set debate decision makers defender deterrence and compellence deterrence failure deterrence theory empirical escalation evaluate evidence example forces foreign policy game theory George and Smoke Goldstein and Freeman GRIM GRIT Huth and Russett immediate deterrence initial International Relations Israel issues Jervis Journal of Conflict Korea Korean War Kugler leaders Lebanon Lebow and Stein Middle East models nonviolent military nuclear deterrence nuclear weapons outcome payoffs player potential predictions present problems propositions provocation and retaliation Quemoy rational choice rational choice theory rational deterrence theory relevant rence role scale points Soviet Union strategy superpower superpower rivalry Syrian Table testing Threat Rating tion U.S.-Soviet United University Press USSR variables violence World Politics Yom Kippur War