The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability After the Cold War

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McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, 1997 - History - 192 pages
Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.
 

Contents

Cumulation in International Relations Methodological Constraints and Solutions
3
Nuclear Deterrence The Record of Aggregate Testing
19
New Directions for Aggregate Testing
47
Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry 194888
56
USSoviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence
94
Nuclear Stability after the Cold War
112
Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War
121
Notes
145
Bibliography
171
Index
189
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About the author (1997)

Frank P. Harvey is Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University.